The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 133
Issue: C
Pages: 273-284

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Contests are ubiquitous in economic, organizational and political settings. Contest designers often use tools to make a contest among asymmetric contestants more even, in order to either elicit higher effort levels, or for ethical reasons. Handicapping – in which stronger participants are a priori weakened – is one successful tool that is widely used in sports, promotional tournaments and procurement auctions. In this study we show theoretically that participants may also increase their destructive effort, and sabotage their rivals’ performance, when handicapping is employed. We empirically verify this prediction using data on 19,635 U.K. horse-races in 2011 and 2012. Our results suggest that while a level field may be conducive to heightened positive effort in general, in a setting where both handicapping and sabotage are present it also lays the ground for greater destruction.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:133:y:2017:i:c:p:273-284
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25