Strategic Effects of Three‐part Tariffs Under Oligopoly

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 54
Issue: 3
Pages: 977-1015

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The distinct element of a three‐part tariff (3PT), compared with linear pricing (LP) or a two‐part tariff, is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero. This quantity target instrument enriches the firm's strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level, even in the absence of a usual price discrimination motive. With general differentiated linear demands, the competitive effect of a 3PT in contrast to LP depends on the degree of substitutability between products: Competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:977-1015
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25