Perverse Incentives? Labor Market Regulation and Performance in the Public Sector

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2019
Volume: 86
Issue: 1
Pages: 271-285

Authors (2)

Alberto Chong (Georgia State University) Angelo Cozzubo (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We test the link between labor market regulations and job performance in the public sector using a novel outcome variable, namely, the number of days it takes the postal service to return letters sent to nonexistent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance. We find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of the labor regulation measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity considerations, which suggest that this finding may be causal.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:86:y:2019:i:1:p:271-285
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25