Targeted search in matching markets

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2020
Volume: 185
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Cheremukhin, Anton (not in RePEc) Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lo...) Tutino, Antonella (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose a parsimonious matching model where a person's choice of whom to meet endogenizes the degree of randomness in matching. The analysis highlights the interaction between a productive motive, driven by the surplus attainable in a match, and a strategic motive, driven by reciprocity of interest of potential matches. We find that the interaction between these two motives differs with preferences—vertical versus horizontal—and that this interaction implies that preferences recovered using our model can look markedly different from those recovered using a model where the degree of randomness is not endogenous. We illustrate these results using data on the U.S. marriage market and show that the model can rationalize the finding of aspirational dating.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:185:y:2020:i:c:s0022053119301061
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25