Jumping the queue: nepotism and public-sector pay

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics
Year: 2021
Volume: 39
Pages: 344-366

Authors (2)

Andri Chassamboulli (not in RePEc) Pedro Gomes (Birkbeck College)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We set up a model with search and matching frictions to understand the effects of employment and wage policies, as well as nepotism in hiring in the public sector, on unemployment and rent seeking. Conditional on inefficiently high public-sector wages, more nepotism in public-sector hiring lowers the unemployment rate because it limits the size of queues for public-sector jobs. Wage and employment policies impose an endogenous constraint on the number of workers the government can hire through connections. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:red:issued:20-120
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25