How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

B-Tier
Journal: World Bank Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 26
Issue: 1
Pages: 61-77

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:wbecrv:v:26:y:2012:i:1:p:61-77
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25