The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 124
Issue: C
Pages: 554-568

Authors (3)

Ciccarone, Giuseppe (not in RePEc) Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni (not in RePEc) Papa, Stefano (Università degli Studi di Roma...)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We aim to empirically investigate the rationale of in-group-favoritism. As potential explanations, we concentrate on intrinsic preferences for own-group members and motivations related to individuals caring about the beliefs of others (founded on guilt aversion). We also consider their intersection. Our evidence shows that in-group-favoritism cannot be accounted for by changes in expectations. This suggests that preferences per se are the most powerful explanation of social identity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:554-568
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25