Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 118
Issue: 2
Pages: 375-377

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that in a modified Mortensen–Pissarides model the bargaining weights depend on the players’ loss-aversion parameters. These weights can hence be calibrated without resorting to an assessment of players’ bargaining powers, which have proved difficult to empirically establish.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:375-377
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25