Collateral Constraints and the Law of One Price: An Experiment

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2018
Volume: 73
Issue: 6
Pages: 2757-2786

Authors (3)

MARCO CIPRIANI (not in RePEc) ANA FOSTEL (not in RePEc) DANIEL HOUSER (George Mason University)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We test the asset pricing implications of collateralized borrowing (that is, of using assets as collateral to borrow money) in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model with collateral constraints amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the laboratory, assets that can be leveraged fetch higher prices than assets that cannot, even though assets' payoffs are identical in all states of the world. Collateral value, therefore, creates deviations from the Law of One Price. The spread between collateralizeable and noncollateralizeable assets is significant and quantitatively close to theoretical predictions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:73:y:2018:i:6:p:2757-2786
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25