Regulating Markups in US Health Insurance

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 11
Issue: 4
Pages: 71-104

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:11:y:2019:i:4:p:71-104
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25