The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 116
Issue: 3
Pages: 702-733

Authors (2)

Carl Andreas Claussen (Sveriges Riksbank) Øistein Røisland (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The discursive dilemma implies that the decision of a board depends on whether the board votes directly on the decision (conclusion-based procedure) or votes on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma might occur. Under majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur either (i) if the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:116:y:2014:i:3:p:702-733
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25