Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 147
Issue: C
Pages: 168-170

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:168-170
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25