The social value of public information with costly information acquisition

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 100
Issue: 2
Pages: 196-199

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:196-199
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25