Corporate governance and blockchains

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2021
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Pages: 1191-1235

Authors (4)

Lin William Cong (not in RePEc) Zhiguo He (Stanford University) Jiasun Li (not in RePEc) Wei Jiang (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The rise of centralized mining pools for risk sharing does not necessarily undermine the decentralization required for blockchains: because of miners’ cross-pool diversification and pool managers’ endogenous fee setting, larger pools better internalize their externality on global hash rates, charge higher fees, attract disproportionately fewer miners, and grow more slowly. Instead, mining pools as a financial innovation escalate miners’ arms race and significantly increase the energy consumption of proof-of-work-based blockchains. Empirical evidence from Bitcoin mining supports our model’s predictions. The economic insights inform other consensus protocols and the industrial organization of mainstream sectors with similar characteristics but ambiguous prior findings.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:34:y:2021:i:3:p:1191-1235.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25