Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 112
Issue: 4
Pages: 782-811

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the cyclical dynamics of job creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable. The no‐shirking constraint may amplify fluctuations in hiring by making firms' surplus share procyclical, and may cause a burst of inefficient firing when a downturn begins. But quantitatively, it mainly raises the cost of motivating marginal workers in booms, since firms cannot commit to keep them in recessions, and thereby strongly damps the countercyclical fluctuations in the separation rate. This implies a robust Beveridge curve, but casts doubt on Ramey and Watson's (1997)“contractual fragility” mechanism and worsens Shimer's (2005a)“volatility puzzle”.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:112:y:2010:i:4:p:782-811
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25