Economic Integration and Political Disintegration

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2000
Volume: 90
Issue: 5
Pages: 1276-1296

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. Under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural, linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small, homogeneous political jurisdictions. This paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries, and successfully tests two implications of the model. Firstly, the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade. Secondly, the history of nation-state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:5:p:1276-1296
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24