The Role of Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: are National Automatic Stabilizers Effective?*

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 16
Issue: 3
Pages: 591-610

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We assess the role of national fiscal policies, as automatic stabilizers, within a monetary union. We use a two‐country New Keynesian DSGE model, incorporating non‐Ricardian consumers and a home bias in national consumption. Fiscal policy directly stabilizes non‐Ricardian agents' consumption. By doing so it contributes to the reduction in the volatility of variables such as output, wage inflation, and real interest rates. Our analysis of country‐specific shocks does not suggest potential inter‐country conflicts (as long as policies are constrained within the automatic stabilizers framework). However, we detect a potential conflict between the two consumer groups, because fiscal policy may raise optimizing agents' consumption volatility.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:16:y:2008:i:3:p:591-610
Journal Field
International
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25