Currency Unions

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2002
Volume: 117
Issue: 2
Pages: 409-436

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Common currencies affect trading costs and, thereby, the amounts of trade, output, and consumption. From the perspective of monetary policy, the adoption of another country's currency trades off the benefits of commitment to price stability (if a committed anchor is selected) against the loss of an independent stabilization policy. We show that the type of country that has more to gain from giving up its own currency is a small open economy heavily trading with one particular large partner, with a history of high inflation and with a business cycle highly correlated with that of the potential "anchor." We also characterize the features of the optimal number of currency unions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:117:y:2002:i:2:p:409-436.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24