Two‐Aggregate Games: Demonstration Using a Production–Appropriation Model

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 121
Issue: 1
Pages: 353-378

Authors (3)

Richard Cornes (not in RePEc) Roger Hartley (not in RePEc) Yuji Tamura (La Trobe University)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We expand the scope of the two‐aggregate method by applying it to a situation in which many heterogeneous players are free to contribute to both aggregates. Such situations naturally arise in various resource allocation problems. Hence, our method is useful in many applications. A production–appropriation model is employed to illustrate how the problem of establishing the Nash equilibrium can be reduced from solving n>2 best‐response functions in n unknowns to solving two consistency conditions in two unknowns. We then conduct a comparative static exercise that the conventional approach could not handle easily, if at all, to demonstrate the power of our method.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:121:y:2019:i:1:p:353-378
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25