Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2003
Volume: 70
Issue: 4
Pages: 785-806

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:4:p:785-806
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25