The Political Economy of Municipal Pension Funding

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Year: 2018
Volume: 10
Issue: 3
Pages: 215-46

Authors (3)

Jeffrey Brinkman (not in RePEc) Daniele Coen-Pirani (University of Pittsburgh) Holger Sieg (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.345 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Many US municipalities have committed to pay retirement benefits to public sector employees but have not saved enough to fulfill these obligations. This paper studies the determinants of municipal pension funding and its implications for intergenerational redistribution using an overlapping generations model. Under perfect capital markets, pension funding choices are fully capitalized into land prices. This neutrality result fails if agents face a binding downpayment constraint in the land market: old agents prefer a pay-as-you-go system, while young agents find a fully funded system optimal. Empirical evidence based on cross-city comparisons of pension liabilities is consistent with these predictions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmac:v:10:y:2018:i:3:p:215-46
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25