Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2021
Volume: 30
Issue: 1
Pages: 139-167

Authors (3)

Brice Corgnet (not in RePEc) Brian Gunia (not in RePEc) Roberto Hernán González (Université Bourgogne Europe)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study several solutions to shirking in teams, each of which triggers social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees are allowed to engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the appeal of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were comparably appealing to a baseline treatment. This suggests that solutions involving social interaction are more likely to be effective in the long‐run than solutions involving monitoring alone.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:30:y:2021:i:1:p:139-167
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25