Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2003
Volume: 114
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 57-77

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In unitary states--states in which constitutional powers are owned by the central government--vertical competition can generate stable outcomes, that is outcomes that do not unravel through arbitrary repossessions by the center. Stability is a product of institutional commitment devices. Through these a democratic government, though it cannot bind successor governments, can effectively oblige them to respect some of the decisions it has made. A number of such commitment devices exist in Italy; they make possible stable vertical competition between central and regional governments. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:114:y:2003:i:1-2:p:57-77
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24