Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2011
Volume: 3
Issue: 4
Pages: 77-106

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:4:p:77-106
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25