Pathways of persuasion

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 124
Issue: C
Pages: 239-253

Authors (2)

Coffman, Lucas (Boston College) Niehaus, Paul (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

While economic theories of persuasion emphasize the role of self-interest, others emphasize other-regard. To study these pathways, we introduce a simple experimental framework where sellers use free-form conversation to convince buyers to raise their valuations for objects. We find sellers more frequently target buyers' self-interest, and changes in self-interest explain more variation in persuasion overall. Additionally, sellers' gains along one pathway come at a considerable cost along the other. However, when sellers target other-regard, they are at their most persuasive.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:239-253
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25