Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2003
Volume: 11
Issue: 1
Pages: 55-71

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:11:y:2003:i:1:p:55-71
Journal Field
International
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25