CATalytic insurance: the case of natural disasters

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Year: 2015
Volume: 31
Issue: 3-4
Pages: 330-349

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why should developing countries buy expensive catastrophe (CAT) insurance? Abstracting from risk aversion or hedging motives, we find that insurance may have a catalytic role on external finance. Such effect is particularly strong in those low- to middle-income countries that face financial constraints when hit by a shock or in its anticipation. Insurance makes defaults less likely, thereby relaxing the country’s borrowing constraint, and enhancing its access to capital markets. The presence of multilateral lenders that explicitly or implicitly provide inexpensive reconstruction funds in the aftermath of a natural disaster weakens but does not eliminate the demand for catalytic insurance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxford:v:31:y:2015:i:3-4:p:330-349.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25