Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 124
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

4.036 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic model with heterogeneous investors and sovereign default to analyze the dynamic link between banking sector capitalization and sovereign bond yields. The banking sector is modelled as operating under a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint, which can bind occasionally. As default risk rises, the constraint may bind, generating a fall in demand for sovereign bonds that can be accompanied by a rise in the risk premium if other agents are more risk averse. In turn, the rise in risk premium leads to a feedback effect through debt accumulation dynamics and the probability of government default.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:inecon:v:124:y:2020:i:c:s0022199620300179
Journal Field
International
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25