The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2018
Volume: 126
Issue: S1
Pages: S26 - S72

Authors (3)

Pierre-André Chiappori (not in RePEc) Monica Costa Dias (not in RePEc) Costas Meghir (Yale University)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match on the basis of the economic value of marriage and preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor, and consume private and public commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British Household Panel Survey.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/698748
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25