Do hospitals respond to changing incentive structures? Evidence from Medicare’s 2007 DRG restructuring

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Health Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 73
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid restructured the diagnosis related group (DRG) system by expanding the number of categories within a DRG to account for complications present within certain conditions. This change allows for differential reimbursement depending on the severity of the case. We examine whether this change incentivized hospitals to upcode patients as sicker to increase their reimbursements. Using the National Inpatient Survey data from HCUP from 2005 to 2010 and three methods to detect the presence of upcoding, our most conservative estimate is an additional three percent of reimbursement is attributable to upcoding. We find evidence of upcoding in government, non-profit, and for-profit hospitals. We find spillover effects of upcoding impacting not only Medicare payers, but also private insurance companies as well.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jhecon:v:73:y:2020:i:c:s0167629618309330
Journal Field
Health
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25