Implementation Details for Frequent Batch Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 5
Pages: 418-24

Authors (3)

Eric Budish (not in RePEc) Peter Cramton (Universität zu Köln) John Shim (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.691 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Our recent research (Budish, Cramton, and Shim 2013) proposes frequent batch auctions—uniform-price sealed-bid double auctions conducted at frequent but discrete time intervals—as a market design alternative to continuous-time trading in financial markets. This short paper discusses the implementation details of frequent batch auctions. We outline the process flow for frequent batch auctions, discuss a modification to the market design that accommodates market fragmentation and Reg NMS, and discuss the engineering and economic considerations relevant for determining the batch interval. Open questions are discussed throughout.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:418-24
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25