Tax avoidance and commodity tax differentiation

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2025
Volume: 257
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Casamatta, Georges (not in RePEc) Cremer, Helmuth (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze the optimal combination of direct and indirect taxes in the presence of tax avoidance. Proportional commodity taxes remain part of the optimal tax structure when avoidance is possible, even when the Atkinson–Stiglitz conditions hold. Taxing consumption, despite avoidance, enhances the screening of unobserved productivity relative to income taxation alone. Under weak separability and homothetic subutility, optimal commodity taxes are positive and uniform. With non-homothetic preferences, uniformity may not hold, and the optimal differentiation between luxuries and necessities depends on the distribution of productivity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:257:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525005518
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25