Earmarking and the political support of fat taxes

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Health Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 50
Issue: C
Pages: 258-267

Authors (3)

Cremer, Helmuth (not in RePEc) Goulão, Catarina (not in RePEc) Roeder, Kerstin (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An unhealthy good causes health issues in the long run. It creates a misperceived utility loss and increases health care costs. Conversely, a healthy good provides misperceived utility gains and reduces health care costs. Individuals differ in income and in their degree of misperception; they vote over a fat tax according to their misperceived utility. A fraction of the tax proceeds is “earmarked” to reduce health insurance premiums; the remainder finances a subsidy on the healthy good. This earmarking rule is determined to maximize welfare, anticipating the induced political equilibrium. The equilibrium fat tax is always lower than the utilitarian level. This is not necessarily true with a Rawlsian objective. The determination of the earmarking rule is complex. Even in the utilitarian case, it is not just used to boost political support for the fat tax. Instead, it may involve a tradeoff between fat tax and healthy good subsidy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jhecon:v:50:y:2016:i:c:p:258-267
Journal Field
Health
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25