Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 1998
Volume: 65
Issue: 2
Pages: 322-330

Authors (2)

H. Cremer (not in RePEc) P. Pestieau (Université de Liège)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic parents prefer late bequests to early inter‐vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1998:i:2:p:322-330
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25