Second‐Best Pollution Taxes and the Structure of Preferences

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2001
Volume: 68
Issue: 2
Pages: 258-280

Authors (3)

Helmuth Cremer (not in RePEc) Firouz Gahvari (University of Illinois at Urba...) Norbert Ladoux (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We characterize optimal taxes on polluting and nonpolluting goods in Ramsey and Mirrlees second‐best environments. The polluting good tax differs from the Pigouvian tax by Ramsey terms in the first and by Stiglitz/Mirrlees plus another adjustment term in the second. These terms can be positive, negative, or zero. If preferences are weakly separable in public and private goods, with the private good subutility weakly separable in labor and produced goods, nonpolluting goods are taxed uniformly and the concept of a tax differential between polluting and nonpolluting goods is well defined. The differential is then less than the Pigouvian tax in the Ramsey framework, but it can be greater, equal to, or smaller than the Pigouvian tax in the Mirrlees second best. In Mirrlees second best, if preferences are separable in labor supply and other goods, the second‐best tax differential is identical to the Pigouvian tax.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:68:y:2001:i:2:p:258-280
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25