Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2007
Volume: 50
Issue: 1
Pages: 181-219

Authors (2)

Crawford, Gregory S (not in RePEc) Shum, Matthew (California Institute of Techno...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in cable television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45 percent of offered service qualities. Furthermore, cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:y:2007:v:50:i:1:p:181-219
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25