“Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2018
Volume: 156
Issue: C
Pages: 219-224

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Traditional game theory assumes that if framing does not affect a game’s payoffs, it will not influence behavior. However, Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and Rubinstein (1999) reported experiments eliciting initial responses to hide-and-seek and other types of game, in which subjects’ behavior responded systematically to non-neutral framing via decision labelings. Crawford and Iriberri (2007ab) proposed a level-k explanation of Rubinstein et al.’s results for hide-and-seek games. Heap, Rojo-Arjona, and Sugden’s (2014) criticized Crawford and Iriberri’s model on grounds of portability. This paper clarifies Heap et al.’s interpretation of their results and responds to their criticisms, suggesting a way forward.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:156:y:2018:i:c:p:219-224
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25