Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines

B-Tier
Journal: World Bank Economic Review
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Pages: 767-789

Authors (4)

Benjamin Crost (University of Calgary) Joseph H Felter (not in RePEc) Hani Mansour (not in RePEc) Daniel I Rees (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:wbecrv:v:34:y::i:3:p:767-789
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25