A hybrid revision protocol of action and links and social coordination

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2023
Volume: 231
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper develops a model in which agents choose a limited number of partners to play a coordination game. We introduce a hybrid revision protocol, in which an agent may revise only her action, only her links or both her action and links. We show that risk-dominant strategy profiles will be (uniquely) selected in the long run.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:231:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523003233
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25