How Do CEOs Matter? The Effect of Industry Expertise on Acquisition Returns

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2013
Volume: 26
Issue: 8
Pages: 2008-2047

Authors (2)

Cláudia Custódio (Imperial College) Daniel Metzger (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows how chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics affect the performance of acquirers in diversifying takeovers. When the acquirer's CEO has previous experience in the target industry, the acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are between 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points larger than those generated by a CEO who is new to the target industry. This outcome is driven by the industry-expert CEO's ability to capture a larger fraction of the merger surplus. Industry-expert CEOs typically negotiate better deals and pay a lower premium for the target. This effect is stronger when information asymmetry is high and in bilateral negotiations compared to auctions. We also find that industry-expert CEOs on average select lower surplus deals. This evidence is consistent with industry-expert CEOs having superior negotiation skills. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:26:y:2013:i:8:p:2008-2047
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25