Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 110
Issue: 3
Pages: 223-225

Authors (2)

Currarini, Sergio (not in RePEc) Marini, Marco ("Sapienza" Università di Roma)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:223-225
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25