Foreclosure externalities and Vacant Property Registration Ordinances

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Urban Economics
Year: 2021
Volume: 123
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Biswas, Arnab (not in RePEc) Cunningham, Chris Gerardi, Kristopher (not in RePEc) Sexton, Daniel (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Vacant Property Registration Ordinances (VPROs) were widely adopted by local U.S. governments to compel mortgage lenders to monitor and maintain foreclosed properties. Using a border discontinuity, triple difference identification strategy, we find that enactment of VPROs in Florida more than halved the negative spillover from proximate foreclosures on arms-length sale prices. This finding is robust to various time-by-location fixed effects, different distance buffers around VPRO/non-VPRO borders, alternative foreclosure measures, and two falsification exercises. Finally, we show that foreclosed properties subject to a VPRO sell at higher prices when ultimately returned to the market, consistent with an underlying physical externality.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:juecon:v:123:y:2021:i:c:s0094119021000176
Journal Field
Urban/Geographic
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25