The reasoning-based expected utility procedure

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 71
Issue: 2
Pages: 328-338

Authors (2)

Cubitt, Robin P. (not in RePEc) Sugden, Robert (University of East Anglia)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of "accumulation" and "deletion" operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermissible; strategies may remain uncategorised when the procedure halts. RBEU and related "categorisation procedures" can be interpreted as tracking successive steps in players' own reasoning.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:328-338
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25