Conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 141
Issue: C
Pages: 110-121

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate whether there is an association between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion, two phenomena that we conjecture share common psychological characteristics despite having been studied largely separately in the previous literature. We use a public goods game to categorize subjects by type of contribution preference and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We report three studies, using two different methods to measure betrayal aversion: a standard elicitation with monetary incentives and a novel scenario-based measure that we argue addresses concerns about the standard measure. We find strong and robust evidence of an association between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion in the scenario-based measures but not in the standard measure.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:110-121
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25