Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2003
Volume: 70
Issue: 4
Pages: 715-741

Authors (3)

Stefania Albanesi (University of Miami) V. V. Chari (not in RePEc) Lawrence J. Christiano (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why is inflation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be the absence of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high or low inflation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the inflation rate is low on average. This analysis suggests that institutions which promote commitment can prevent high inflation episodes from recurring. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:4:p:715-741
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24