Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 150
Issue: C
Pages: 99-103

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:99-103
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25