Sticky Wages on the Layoff Margin

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2025
Volume: 115
Issue: 2
Pages: 491-524

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We design and field an innovative survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients that yields new insights about wage stickiness on the layoff margin. A majority of UI recipients would accept pay cuts of 5–10 percent to save their jobs, and one-third would accept a 25 percent cut. Yet worker-employer discussions about cuts in pay, benefits, or hours in lieu of layoffs are exceedingly rare. Roughly one-quarter of the layoffs in our sample violate the theoretical condition for bilaterally efficient separations. We draw on our findings and other evidence to assess theories of wage stickiness and its role in layoffs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:115:y:2025:i:2:p:491-524
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25