Ensuring Sales: A Theory of Inter-firm Credit

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2011
Volume: 3
Issue: 1
Pages: 245-79

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose a simple theory to account for the prevalence of interfirm credit at an interest rate of zero. A downstream firm trades off inventory holding costs against lost sales. Lost final sales impose a negative externality on the upstream firm. The solution requires a subsidy limited by the value of inputs. Allowing the downstream firm to pay with a delay is precisely such a solution. A reverse externality accounts for the use of prepayment. We clarify how input prices vary with such policies, and when trade credit/prepayment is more efficient than pure input price adjustments. (JEL D21, D62, D92, G31, L25)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:1:p:245-79
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25