Liquidity regulation, banking history and financial fragility: An experimental examination

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2022
Volume: 200
Issue: C
Pages: 1372-1383

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report an experiment conducted to evaluate interactions between liquidity requirements and depositors’ experiences with the banking system. Treatments consist of combinations of required liquidity levels and ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ background conditions, intended to induce stable histories of play (with few bank runs), or unstable histories of play (where bank runs are common). Experimental results suggest that both increased liquidity levels and a stable history of play improve the incidence of coordination on the Pareto-preferred no-run outcome. Nevertheless, even with an unstable history, non-degenerate no-run outcomes occur quite reliably with high liquidity requirements.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:1372-1383
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25