On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 150
Issue: C
Pages: 73-76

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:73-76
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25